Problems in Third Party Action Procedure Under the Wisconsin Worker\u27s Compensation Act by Piper, Donald H.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 60
Issue 1 Fall 1976 Article 4
Problems in Third Party Action Procedure Under
the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act
Donald H. Piper
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Donald H. Piper, Problems in Third Party Action Procedure Under the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act, 60 Marq. L. Rev. 91 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol60/iss1/4
PROBLEMS IN THIRD PARTY ACTION
PROCEDURE UNDER THE WISCONSIN
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT
DONALD H. PIPER*
INTRODUCTION
Compensation recoverable under Wisconsin's Worker's
Compensation Act' is not conditioned on the negligence of ei-
ther the employee or employer. For example, a negligent em-
ployee may receive compensation from a non-negligent em-
ployer provided other conditions of the Worker's Compensation
Act are met.2
Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act also expressly
states that where conditions exist entitling an employee to the
right to a recovery of compensation, such recovery shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer and the worker's com-
pensation insurance carrier.3
However, while the exclusive remedy provision of Wiscon-
sin's Worker's Compensation Act prevents the employee from
maintaining a tort action against his employer and his em-
ployer's compensation carrier, the injured employee may, nev-
ertheless, bring suit against a third person whose negligent acts
caused the employee's injury. This third party action is ex-
pressly permitted in the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation
Act.4 Pursuant to Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act, an
employee or his employer (or compensation carrier) may make
* B.A. 1969, Carthage College; J.D. 1972, University of Wisconsin; Associate with
the law firm of Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
member of the American, Wisconsin and Milwaukee Bar Associations.
1. Wis. STAT. §102.01 (1973) was amended by Wis. Laws 1975, ch. 200, §58 (effec-
tive April 14, 1976), so as to change the title "Workmen's Compensation Act" to
"Worker's Compensation Act." Wis. Laws 1975, ch. 147, changes the terminology of
the substantive sections of the Act so as to eliminate references to gender. All refer-
ences to the Act in this article are to the new title "Worker's Compensation Act," and
all quotations are taken from the amended statutes.
2. See Wis. STAT. §102.03 (1973); see also Milwaukee County v. Department of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 48 Wis.2d 392, 180 N.W.2d 513 (1970), and
American Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 1 Wis.2d 261, 271, 83 N.W.2d 714, 720
(1957).
3. Wis. STAT. §102.03(2) (1973); see also 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION §65.00 (1976).
4. Wis. STAT. §102.29(1) (1973).
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a claim or maintain an action in tort against a third party tort-
feasor.5 The theory underlying third party actions is to preserve
the traditional fault concept of placing responsibility for dam-
ages sustained upon the culpable party.
In the event that there is recovery from the third party tort-
feasor, Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act provides that
such recovery must follow a statutory distribution formula.7
Under this formula, the employer or its insurance carrier re-
ceives reimbursement for payments which it was obligated to
make under the Act.
8
Over the years, a number of procedural and substantive
problems have arisen under section 102.29(1)-the section
which discusses party joinder, notice requirements, and the
distribution of proceeds recovered in a third party action. This
article will comment on. the differences in the interpretation
and application of section 102.29(1) in third party actions
commenced prior to January 1, 1976.1 In addition, this article
will discuss the impact which chapter 803 of the new Wisconsin
Rules of Civil Procedure 0 has upon third party actions.
I. THIRD PARTY ACTION PROCEDURE PRIOR TO THE NEW RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Three aspects of third party action procedure which have
plagued attorneys, due to the disparate interpretation and
application of section 102.29(1), are party joinder, the necessity
for assignment of interests, and the notice to be given to inter-
ested parties. The following portion of this article will examine
each of these problems.
A. Party Joinder Under Section 102.29(1)
The question has frequently been raised in third party ac-
tions as to whether the compensation carrier or employer who
5. Id. It should be noted that the employee or employer (or compensation carrier)
may sue for the full amount, and the distribution formula will prevent double recovery.
6. Severin v. Luchinske, 271 Wis. 378, 73 N.W.2d 477 (1955); see also 2A A. LARSON,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §71.00 (1976).
7. Wis. STAT. §102.29(1) (1973).
8. Id.
9. The effective date of the new Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure is January 1,
1976.
10. The new Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by Order of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, dated February 17, 1975, as amended by the court on
September 30, 1975, effective January 1, 1976. The rules have been codified by the
Revisor of Statutes as chapters 801 through 807 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
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has paid benefits is a "necessary" or "indispensable" party,
and, conversely, whether in an action commenced by the em-
ployer or compensation carrier for benefits paid under the Act
to the injured employee, the injured employee must be joined
as a necessary or indispensable party."
Section 102.29(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides in
part:
If notice is giv en as provided in this subsection, the liability
of the tort-feasor shall be determined as to all parties having
a right to make claim, and irrespective of whether or not all
parties join in prosecuting such claim, the proceeds of such
claim shall be divided as follows ....
Under the above statutory language, if notice is given, all par-
ties having a right to make a claim should receive the section
102.29 distribution even if not joined as parties. This conclu-
sion is supported not only by the clear language of the statute,
but also by case law construing section 102.29(1).
In Holmgren v. Strebig,12 the defendants and third party
plaintiffs opposed the worker's compensation insurer's motion
for summary judgment of dismissal arguing that the insurer
was an indispensable party by virtue of payments made by it
as the worker's compensation insurer. Rejecting this argument,
the court stated:
Under the Wisconsin statutes ... the compensation insurer
may intervene or prosecute a third party claim, but there is
no requirement that the compensation insurer be joined as a
party plaintiff. 3
The Holmgren decision relied on Johannsen v. Peter P.
Woboril, Inc.," in which a third party tort-feasor sought to
implead the employer in its status as a worker's compensation
self-insurer. In upholding the trial court's refusal to grant the
motion, the Johannsen court stated:
While [the worker's compensation self-insurer] had a
substantial interest in the amount of damages the plaintiff
should recover and by sec. 102.29(1), Stats., has been given
11. Wi. STAT. §260.12 (1973) governs joinder of necessary and indispensable par-
ties in actions commenced prior to January 1, 1976. As to actions commenced on or
after January 1, 1976, Wis. STAT. §803.03 (1973) governs.
12. 54 Wis.2d 590, 196 N.W.2d 655 (1971).
13. Id. at 598, 196 N.W.2d at 659 (emphasis in original).
14. 260 Wis. 341, 51 N.W.2d 53 (1952).
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the right to participate in the plaintiffs action to protect that
interest, it had served notice that it waived that right. The
injured employee's right of action and the amount of damages
to which he is entitled are theoretically unaffected by the
statutory disposition of the sum which the jury finds will
compensate him for his injuries. Clark v. Chicago, M., St.P.
& P.R. Co. (1934), 214 Wis. 295, 252 N.W. 685. The presence
of his employer in his action against the tort-feasor is unnec-
essary to the determination of the issues and, as the employer
had waived its right to participate, we find no error in the
denial of the motion to make the employer a party.'
5
The court further held that the employer's decision not to join
"only went to its participation in the litigation; the division of
such damages as may be awarded is settled by statute [section
102.29(1)]."'1
Skornia v. Highway Pavers, Inc.'7 also provides support for
the proposition that section 102.29(1) distribution is available
to a nonjoined compensation insurer or employee. Skornia ad-
dressed the issue of whether a worker's compensation carrier
which had made payments to the injured employee - plaintiff
was subject to having its employees called adversely for exami-
nation at trial by the third party tort-feasor, even though not
a party to the action. The court held that the worker's compen-
sation carrier's employees were subject to adverse examination,
noting that regardless of whether or not the carrier was a plain-
tiff in the action, "the proceeds, after deduction of a reasonable
cost of collection, must be divided by the injured employee and
the payor of the compensation benefits"'8 as prescribed by the
distribution formula under section 102.29(1).
The same rule has been clearly enunciated in actions
commenced by the employer against the third party tort-
15. Id. at 345-46, 51 N.W.2d at 55 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 345, 51 N.W.2d at 55. See also Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Icke,
225 Wis. 304, 274 N.W. 283 (1937). Huck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 14 Wis.2d
445, 111 N.W.2d 434 (1961), holds that the statutory formula for distribution of pro-
ceeds in a third party action applies to settlements of claims as well as judgments
granting monetary awards.
Note that litigants can by consensual stipulation provide for a division of proceeds
different from the statutory formula, but the distribution formula of Wis. STAT. §
102.29(1) (1973) is controlling in the absence of such a stipulation. Rice v. Gruetz-
macher, 30 Wis.2d 222, 140 N.W.2d 238 (1966).
17. 34 Wis.2d 160, 148 N.W.2d 678 (1966).
18. Id. at 165, 148 N.W.2d at 680-81.
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feasor. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Icke 9
holds that "the employee is entitled to share in the recovery
against a third party whether the suit be begun by the em-
ployee or by the employer or insurance carrier, regardless of
joinder by the employee.""0
In spite of the authority noted above, in some circuits the
worker's compensation insurer has been considered a necessary
party either as plaintiff or as a nominal defendant. Other
courts, in addition, insist on active participation by the attor-
ney for the compensation insurer, simply by virtue of that at-
torney having filed a notice of statutory interest.
Insurance Company of North America v. Blinddauers Sheet
Metal and Heating Co.2 appears to be in contradiction to the
above-mentioned state court authority insofar as it holds that
an injured employee is an indispensable party in a third party
action. However, the case involved a motion to intervene as of
right under Federal Rule 24, made by the injured employee, for
the purpose of destroying diversity jurisdiction in an action
commenced by the compensation carrier against the wishes of
the employee. The court found the employee to be an indispen-
sable party on the basis that a contrary finding would create
the "anomalous" and "untenable" situation of denying the
injured employee his right under section 102.29 to an "equal
voice" in the prosecution of his claim since a section 102.29(1)
judgment is binding "as to all parties having right to make
claim . . . irrespective of whether or not all parties join in
prosecuting such claim."2"
Thus, in spite of clear statutory language and seemingly
definitive case law to the effect that distribution of the pro-
ceeds according to the statutory formula occurs irrespective of
whether or not all parties having a right to make claim are
joined in the third party action, the necessity for joinder or
participation of the worker's compensation insurance carrier in
the third party action has not been uniformly decided.
19. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Icke, 225 Wis. 304, 274 N.W. 283 (1937).
20. Id. at 309, 274 N.W. at 285.
21. 61 F.R.D. 323 (E.D. Wis. 1973). See also Hraback v. Madison Gas and Elec.
Co., 240 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1957); Slauson v. Standard Oil Co., 29 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.
Wis. 1939). Compare Travelers Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 620
(W.D. Wis. 1950), with Murray v. Dewar, 6 Wis.2d 411, 94 N.W.2d 635 (1959).
22. Wis. STAT. §102.29(1) (1973).
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B. Assignment of Interest as a Condition Precedent to
Section 102.29 Distribution
As a result of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in
Heifetz v. Johnson" there has been a considerable amount of
concern among attorneys handling third party actions as to
whether an assignment to the plaintiff by the nonparty com-
pensation carrier is necessary in order to preserve its right to
recover amounts paid to the injured employee.
Heifetz was an automobile negligence case arising out of an
accident which occurred in 1968 resulting in personal injuries
to the plaintiff. Heifetz received two thousand dollars for medi-
cal expenses from his liability insurer, and, in return, executed
a "subrogation receipt and assignment" to the insurer in 1969.
Heifetz then commenced a personal injury action against the
driver of the other vehicle, eleven days before the statute of
limitations was to run, without joining the insurer as a plain-
tiff. The defendants moved for summary judgment after the
eleven day period ran, contending that the insurer was an in-
dispensable party by virtue of its subrogated interest under the
1969 assignment, and further contending that the failure to join
this indispensable party within three years following the acci-
dent failed to toll the statute of limitations for personal injury
actions.24 Consequently the defendants argued that the entire
action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court
rejected the defendants' arguments and denied the motion for
summary judgment, and defendants appealed.
Noting that in Wisconsin "the running of the statute of
limitations extinguishes not only the right of action but also the
cause of action, '25 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
the insurer had effectively been barred from bringing its cause
of action. The court took cognizance of the prior holding in
Patitucci v. Gerhardt26 that a liability insurer subrogated by
virtue of an assignment was considered an indispensable party,
but found that in Heifetz the insurer's cause of action was
barred by the statute of limitations so that it no longer had any
interest in the action and was no longer indispensable.
Then, in the language which has created a great deal of
23. 61 Wis.2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
24. Wis. STAT. §893.205(1) (1971).
25. 61 Wis.2d at 115, 211 N.W.2d at 836.
26. 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932).
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controversy, 7 the court commented broadly in regard to the
effect of the insurer's payment of medical expenses:
Acceptance of payment from an insurer operates as an
assignment of the claim to that extent whether or not the
policy contains a subrogation agreement. The plaintiff loses
his right to sue for any amount received from his insurer.2
A literal reading of this statement would arguably eliminate or
curtail the collateral source rule, which provides that a per-
sonal injury claimant's recovery is not to be' reduced by the
amount of compensation received from other sources, such as
sick leave or insurance. 9
The response of some compensation carrier attorneys to
Heifetz has been to read the decisiori broadly and to proceed
as if the decision requires them to assign their interests under
section 102.29 to the plaintiff-employee in the third party lia-
bility action in cases where the employer or compensation in-
surer is not joined together with the employee as a party. This
response is evidenced by some attorneys not only pleading the
existence of an assignment, but also, by direct citation to the
pronouncements of Heifetz itself.30
It is the opinion of the author that Heifetz does not require
that an assignment be given prior to the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations in order for section 102.29 distribution to be
available to the nonparty compensation carrier since Heifetz is
27. See generally Barton, "Heifetz" and the Collateral Source Rule, 48 Wis. B.
BULL. 27 (1975).
28. 61 Wis.2d at 124, 211 N.W.2d at 841.
29. See generally Barton, "Heifetz" and the Collateral Source Rule, 48 Wis. B.
BULL. 27 (1975), and Payne v. Bilco, 54 Wis.2d 424, 433, 195 N.W.2d 641, 647 (1972),
regarding the definition of the collateral source rule.
30. One such pleading recently encountered by the author came with a copy of the
assignment agreement attached and stated:
[Alt time of trial, the [workmen's compensation carrier] will assign its
further subrogation interest for additional payments under the workmen's com-
pensation policy to the time of trial to [the employee]. These assignments are
made so as to fully protect the plaintiffs and the [workmen's compensation
carrier] because of the pronouncements of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
case of Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis.2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973), with the
assignments having been made within the time prescribed by law.
Copy on file with the author. See also Richtman v. Honkamp, 245 Wis. 68, 13 N.W.2d
597 (1944), wherein the court held that the amount which the employer or insurer is
authorized to receive out of the amount recovered against the party for injuries of the
employee is not only the amount already paid out under compensation award, but the
amount for which the employer or insurer is liable in future benefits to the injured
employee.
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distinguishable on its facts. The insurer in Heifetz was not a
worker's compensation insurer." Its rights were derived from
the subrogation receipt and assignment executed by its in-
sured, Heifetz. Worker's compensation insurers, on the other
hand, derive their rights directly from section 102.29, which
gives an employer or compensation carrier a statutory right and
a fixed formula for a monetary recovery. The statutory distri-
bution formula found in section 102.29(1) binds the employee,
insurance carrier and third party tort-feasor to a distribution
which does not permit collateral source recovery. Under section
102.29(1), if the notice provision is complied with3 both the
employee and employer or insurance carrier become bound by
a formula which does not permit, and which did not permit
prior to Heifetz, the employee to receive that portion of the
recovery representing the amount of worker's compensation
benefits paid.
In addition, the language of section 102.29 arguably makes
a third party action unique and distinguishable from Heifetz.
Nothing in the language of section 102.29 requires the giving
of an assignment as a condition precedent to receiving section
102.29 distribution. An examination of section 102.29(1) re-
veals that notice is the only condition precedent to participa-
tion in the distribution. Applying the principle of statutory
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius it is arguable
that the legislature intended to make notice the only condition
precedent.
The conclusion that an assignment given prior to the expi-
ration of the statute of limitations is not a condition precedent
to receiving section 102.29 distribution is also reinforced by the
legislative history behind section 102.29.13
Prior to 1931, section 102.29(1) provided that the making of
a claim under the worker's compensation act against an em-
ployer or worker's compensation carrier by an employee oper-
31. A first plea in abatement, grounded on the plaintiff's failure to allege that
notice was given to the plaintiff's worker's compensation carrier or that the carrier had
waived its right to participate under §102.29(1), was abandoned when it was learned
that the plaintiff's worker's compensation insurer had, prior to the commencement of
the personal injury action, assigned to the plaintiff all claims against the defendants
to recover amounts paid or to be paid as benefits to the plaintiff. 61 Wis.2d at 113-14,
211 N.W.2d at 836.
32. See discussion regarding notice infra at 100.
33. See generally Arnold, Third Party Actions and Products Liability, 46 MARQ. L.
REV. 135 (1962), for a discussion of the legislative history of Wis. STAT. §102.29 (1973).
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ated as an assignment of the third party action to the carrier
or employer, and that any excess recovered by the employer or
carrier would go to the injured employee after deducting the
reasonable costs of collection. The injured employee could only
institute an action if the insurance carrier or employer failed
to pursue a third party action upon demand. 4
In 1931, the term "assignment" was removed and the in-
jured employee was given the right to bring a third party action
and the employer or carrier became entitled to "reasonable
notice and opportunity to join in such action." 5 The Wisconsin
court in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Icke,36
commenting on the legislative history behind section 102.29,
stated as follows:
By the amendment in 1931, the employer and insurance car-
rier were no longer regarded as assignees, nor was the em-
ployer regarded as an assignor. An independent right of ac-
tion was given under the conditions stated in the statute to
the employer and insurance carrier. No doubt this was done
in an effort to avoid the legal implications involved in the
transaction denominated an assignment, and to prevent, in
34. Wis. STAT. §102.29(1)(a) (1929) provided, in part:
The making of a lawful claim against an employer or compensation insurer
for compensation under sections 102.03 to 102.34 for the injury or death of an
employe shall operate as an assignment of any cause of action in tort which the
employe or his personal representative may have against any other party for
such injury or death; and such employer or insurer may enforce in their own
name or names the liability of such other party for their benefit as their interests
may appear. . . .The failure of the employer or compensation insurer in inter-
est to pursue his remedy against the third party within ninety days after written
demand by a compensation beneficiary, shall entitle such beneficiary or his
representatives to enforce liability in his own name, accounting of the proceeds
to be made on the basis above provided.
35. Wis. STAT. §102.29(1)(a) (1929) was altered by ch. 132, §§ 1 and 2, [1931] Wis.
Laws 255 to provide as follows:
(1) (a) The making of a claim for compensation against an employer or compen-
sation insurer for the injury or death of an employe shall not affect the right of
the employe or his personal representative to make claim or maintain an action
in tort against any other party for such injury or death, but the employer or his
insurer shall be entitled to reasonable notice and opportunity to join in such
action. If they or either of them join in such action, they shall be entitled to
repayment of the amount paid by them as compensation as a first claim upon
the net proceeds of such action (deducting the reasonable costs of collection) in
excess of one-third of such net proceeds, which shall be paid to the employe in
all cases.
36. 225 Wis. 304, 274 N.W. 283 (1937). Icke held that an employee is entitled to
share in the recovery against a third party whether suit is begun by the employee,
employer, or insurance carrier regardless of joinder.
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cases where the employer or insurance carrier did not assert
a claim against a third party, the necessity of a reassignment
to the injured employee in order to entitle the employee to
maintain the action.3 7
Inasmuch as the legislative history behind section 102.29
abandoned an assignment as a prerequisite to distribution, the
present statute should be construed as not requiring an assign-
ment to be given in order to receive section 102.29 distribution.
Notice should be the only condition precedent to receiving sec-
tion 102.29 distribution in third party actions commenced prior
to January 1, 1976, the effective date of chapter 803 of the
Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure. If such notice is given,
section 102.29(1) provides for distribution under the statutory
formula irrespective of whether or not all parties join in the
prosecution of the claim.
In short, the language of the statute does not require that
an assignment be given in order for a nonparty employer or
compensation carrier to receive section 102.29 distribution.
However, this conclusion has not been accepted by some attor-
neys and judges handling third party actions, as evidenced by
the continued practice of assignments and the insistence by
some courts that such assignments are necessary in order for a
compensation carrier to receive section 102.29 distribution.
Thus, as with the question of party joinder discussed above, the
interpretation and application of section 102.29 in third party
actions not governed by chapter 803 of the new civil procedure
rules has not been uniform.
C. Notice Required Pursuant to Section 102.29
Another aspect of third party action procedure which has
created substantial problems concerns the notice required by
section 102.29(1) to be given by the party who has made a claim
or commenced a third party action to the other interested
party.
The relevant portion of section 102.29(1) provides in part
(with emphasis placed on the problem areas):
The making of a claim for compensation against an employer
or compensation insurer for the injury or death of an employe
shall not affect the right of the employe, the employe's per-
sonal representative, or other person entitled to bring action,
37. Id. at 307-08, 274 N.W. at 285.
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to make claim or maintain an action in tort against any other
party for such injury or death, hereinafter referred to as a
third party. . . . The employer or compensation insurer who
shall have paid or is obligated to pay a lawful claim under
this chapter shall have the same right to make claim or main-
tain an action in tort against any other party for such injury
or death. However, each shall give to the other, reasonable
notice and opportunity to join in the making of such claim
or the instituting of an action and to be represented by
counsel. If a party entitled to notice cannot be found, the
department shall become the agent of such party for the giv-
ing of notice as required in this subsection and the notice,
when given to the department, shall include an affidavit set-
ting forth the facts, including the steps taken to locate such
party. . . . If notice is given as provided in this subsection,
the liability of the tort-feasor shall be determined as to all
parties having a right to make claim, and irrespective of
whether or not all parties join in prosecuting such claim, the
proceeds of such claim shall be divided [according to the
statutory formula].
An examination of the above-quoted portion of section
102.29 raises the following crucial questions: (1) Who is re-
quired to have notice; (2) For what purpose is notice given; and
(3) By what time must such notice be given? These questions
can be conveniently discussed through an analysis of Achtziger
v. Christian," an unpublished written decision rendered by a
Milwaukee County circuit court.
Achtziger involved a third party action brought by an in-
jured employee which was settled prior to trial for the sum of
$16,000.00. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the worker's com-
pensation carrier, had made compensation payments under
chapter 102 in the amount of $2,208.04. Since section 102.29
requires court approval of all settlements in third party ac-
tions,3 9 the plaintiff moved for court approval of the settlement.
Plaintiff also requested that the compensation carrier, under
the circumstances of the case, be foreclosed from claiming any
reimbursement for those monies paid on the plaintiffs behalf.
38. Case no. C 400-263 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, May
17, 1974).
39. Wis. STAT. §102.29(1) (1973) concludes with the following sentence: "A settle-
ment of any third party claim shall be void unless said settlement and the distribution
of the proceeds thereof is approved by the court before whom the action is pending and
if no action is pending, then by a court of record or by the department."
1976]
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Liberty was never given notice by the plaintiff so as to afford
Liberty the opportunity to join in the prosecution of the claim.
On this ground, Liberty appeared by counsel to oppose the
plaintiff's motion and request that the court permit Liberty to
participate in the proceeds of the settlement.
The court held for the plaintiff, thereby foreclosing Liberty
from participating in the distribution of the settlement pro-
ceeds. The court reasoned that section 102.29 distribution is
conditioned upon giving notice either by the employee or the
employer (depending on which party commenced the action) in
concluding that Liberty was not entitled to reimbursement. In
its decision, the court stated as follows:
The wording of sec. 102.29(1), Wis. Stats., does, in the court's
opinion, create somewhat of an anomalous situation in that
a suing party, whether it be the employee or the employer,
appears to be rewarded by the failure to give notice as pro-
vided in the statute. The plain sense of the statute is that
either party shall notify the other of his intention to com-
mence an action against the tort feasor; however, we find no
sanction for the failure to give notice. The opposite appears
to be true. . . [citing 102.29(1)].
The language [of section 102.29(1)] is certainly not
equivocal or ambiguous. It is undisputed in this case that
Liberty never received notice from Achtziger of the pendency
of his action against the tort feasor. We find no language in
102.29 which gives Liberty any aid and comfort to support
their present contention that they are now entitled to partici-
pate.4"
The court also interpreted the Heifetz v. Johnson case as
precluding the injured employee-plaintiff from collateral
source recovery of the amounts paid by the compensation car-
rier under chapter 102. The court found significance in the fact
that Liberty, having equal rights with the injured employee-
plaintiff to commence a third party action, declined to act on
those rights. Following the Heifetz rationale, the court then
held that the cause of action of Liberty had been laid to rest
by the statute of limitations.4'
40. See note 38 supra.
41. The authors of a recent article on the new Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure
point out that the effect of § 803.03(2) should be to eliminate the Heifetz statute of
limitations problem which is created when the holder of one "part" of a cause of action
commences an action without joining as plaintiffs the possessors of the other parts of
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Of little consolation to Liberty was the court's advice to
worker's compensation insurers in third party actions:
Apparently the only safe course for a compensation car-
rier, absent notice, is either to commence an action on its
own, which admittedly was not done here, join in the lawsuit
with the employee, as the statute provides, or assign to the
employee whatever rights the compensation carrier has and
allow him to prosecute the action as an assignee.42
The attorney for Liberty argued that the statutory language
stating that "each [third party claimant] shall give to the
other reasonable notice" was mandatory, requiring the plaintiff
in absolute terms to give reasonable notice and opportunity to
join in the making of a claim. 3 Noting that the plaintiff had
admitted that the statutory directive had not been followed,
counsel for Liberty further argued:
The plaintiff now attempts to take advantage of his fail-
ure to give such notice by asking the court to award to him
the entire proceeds of settlement without recognizing the
compensation carrier's payments to him and on his behalf by
way of medical expenses. It would appear to be completely
without merit to allow the plaintiff to deliberately fail to
comply with the deliberate mandate of the Statute and then
turn around and take advantage of his own non-compliance."
The solution suggested by Liberty's counsel was to construe
the notice portion of section 102.29 as eliminating notice as a
prerequisite to participation in the proceeds distribution. This
construction could be facilitated, in Liberty's view, by treating
the notice provision of section 102.29 as two separate sentences.
That is, to change section 102.29(1) as it now stands:
the same cause of action and the statute of limitations runs on the nonjoined parties.
Under ch. 803, the entire claim, including all of its constituent parts, is commenced
with the filing of a summons provided that within a reasonable time after objection is
made the other parties holding parts of the claim ratify the plaintiff's commencement
of the action or are themselves joined or substituted in the action. Clausen and Lowe,
The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapters 801-803, 59 MARQ. L. REy. 1,
86-90 (1976); see also Wis. STAT. §803.01 (1973).
42. See note 38 supra. It should be noted that Achtziger was governed by the old
civil procedure rules and thus the options after joinder spelled out in Wis. STAT.
§803.03(2)(b) (1973) were not available to the court for use in the case. Yet the
alternatives suggested by the court for compensation carriers to choose from are
remarkably similar to the subsequently adopted options in Wis. STAT. §803.03 (2)(b)
(1973).
43. Letter brief on behalf of Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., dated May 24, 1974.
44. Id.
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If notice is given as provided in this subsection, the liabil-
ity of the tort-feasor shall be determined as to all parties
having a right to make claim, and irrespective of whether or
not all parties join in prosecuting such claim, the proceeds of
such claim shall be divided [according to the statutory for-
mula].
to read as follows:
If notice is given as provided in this subsection, the liabil-
ity of the tort-feasor shall be determined as to all parties
having a right to make claim. Irrespective of whether or not
all parties join in prosecuting such claim, the proceeds of
such claim shall be divided [according to the statutory for-
mula] ."s
Following the court's decision in Achtziger, and in light of
the arguments submitted by Liberty, the parties settled their
differences, with Liberty accepting fifty percent of its section
102.29 share.
The interpretation advocated above by counsel for Liberty,
appears to be logical and consistent with the statutory intent
of providing a just division of third party liability proceeds
while avoiding an inadvertent benefit to plaintiffs who fail to
comply with the statutory mandate for notice.
In the author's opinion, the lack of timely notice relates
entirely to the question of selection of counsel and control of
the litigation- not the right to receive distribution under sec-
tion 102.29.8 Section 102.29 distribution should be given to any
party receiving notice prior to actual distribution.
Permitting section 102.29 distribution to any party receiv-
ing notice prior to distribution would also be in line with the
policy goal of protecting the tort-feasor from paying once to the
insured and once again to the insurer for the same injury, as
well as the policy goal of promoting judicial economy and effi-
ciency. 7
In addition, permitting section 102.29 distribution to any
party receiving notice prior to actual distribution is in accord-
ance with the realities of a third party action. Obviously, the
45. Id.
46. See Johannsen v. Peter P. Woboril, Inc., 260 Wis. 341, 51 N.W.2d 53 (1952),
where the Wisconsin court commented that the decision to join in a third party action
goes only to participation in the litigation.
47. See Patitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932).
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injured employee and his attorney have actual knowledge that
compensation indemnity has been paid. In addition, the com-
pensation insurer or employer likewise knows that a compensa-
tion payment has been made. The only party who may not be
aware of the fact that compensation indemnity has been paid
is the third party tort-feasor defendant. Notice, prior to distri-
bution, would protect that tort-feasor4 5
Finally, permitting section 102.29 distribution as outlined
above, would not result in a windfall to the attorney represent-
ing a worker's compensation carrier which, for example, did not
join in the pressing of the third party claim until the day of
distribution. Section 102.29(1) provides:
If both the employe or the employe's personal representative
or other person entitled to bring action, and the employer or
compensation insurer, join in the pressing of said claim and
are represented by counsel, the attorneys' fees allowed as a
part of the costs of collection shall be, unless otherwise agreed
upon, divided between such attorneys as directed by the
court or by the department.
If the attorney representing the worker's compensation carrier
did nothing but step in on the day of the distribution, for exam-
ple, his share of the total attorneys' fees allowed should be
minimal, or nonexistent.
A suggested solution to the Achtziger problem would be to
permit section 102.29 distribution to all parties who receive
notice49 at any time prior to the actual distribution of proceeds.
Such an interpretation of section 102.29 would be reasonable
since it would prevent a noncomplying plaintiff from being
awarded for his failure to give notice that an action had been
commenced, and, at the same time, protect the tort-feasor
from vexatious litigation by binding all participants who have
received notice to the distribution.
An additional problem remains, however, since late notice
may, as a practical matter, prevent the absent compensation
carrier from adequately protecting its interests in the event
48. See Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
49. This article does not discuss the question of what constitutes sufficient notice.
In this regard, reference to the analogous situations in Wolff v. Sisters of St. Francis
of Holy Cross, 41 Wis.2d 594, 164 N.W.2d 501 (1969), Holmgren v. Strebig, 54 Wis.2d
590, 196 N.W.2d 655 (1971), and Johannsen v. Peter P. Woboril, Inc., 260 Wis. 341, 51
N.W.2d 53 (1952), may be helpful.
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that settlement negotiations are being conducted. In particu-
lar, if the negotiated settlement is not sufficiently large to cover
the full reimbursement to which the compensation carrier is
entitled under the statute, the compensation carrier would, for
all intents and purposes, have lost its equal voice in the control
of the claim. Perhaps the solution to this problem would be to
require the consent of the compensation carrier receiving late
notice to any settlement to be approved by the court pursuant
to section 102.29(1), or at least a showing by the plaintiff that
the settlement is equitable, having the interests of the compen-
sation carrier in mind."0
In short, judicial or legislative clarification of the problems
posed by Achtziger should be pursued along some of the above-
suggested lines.
II. CHAPTER 803 AND ITS EFFECT ON THIRD PARTY ACTIONS-
THE CONFLICT IN THE JOINDER REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS
102.29(1) AND 803.03
The advent of the new Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure 51
requires a reexamination of the joinder problem in third party
actions. As noted above, it is the author's opinion that, in spite
of some practice to the contrary, the clear language of section
102.29(1) itself, and the case law construing that section, estab-
lish that if notice requirements are met, all parties having a
right to make claim under section 102.29 share in the distribu-
tion of proceeds irrespective of their joinder or nonjoinder.
However, the effect of new rule 803.03(2) may be to require
joinder in all cases, notwithstanding the language of section
102.29(1).
Although section 803.03 is based on Federal Rule 19, as
amended in 1966, subsection (2) of section 803.03 is entirely
new.52 That subsection provides as follows:
(2) CLAIMS ARISING BY SUBROGATION, DERIVATION AND
ASSIGNMENT.
50. Note that Wis. STAT. §102.29(4) (1973) provides for the voiding of any settle-
ment in the event that notice of insurance coverage or common control is not given.
Note also that Rice v. Gruetzmacher, 30 Wis.2d 222, 140 N.W.2d 238 (1966), holds that
a court can look at equitable considerations in determining the share of proceeds in a
§ 102.29(4) situation.
51. See note 10 supra.
52. See Clausen and Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapters
801-803, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 81 (1976).
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(a) Joinder of related claims. A party asserting a claim
for affirmative relief shall join as parties to the action all
persons who at the commencement of the action have claims
based upon subrogation to the rights of the party asserting
the principal claim, derivation from the principal claim, or
assignment of part of the principal claim. For purposes of this
section, a person's right to recover for loss of consortium shall
be deemed a derivation right. Any party asserting a claim
based upon subrogation to part of the claim of another, deri-
vation from the rights or claim of another, or assignment of
part of the rights or claim of another shall join as a party to
the action the person to whose rights he is subrogated, from
whose claim he derives his rights or claim, or by whose assign-
ment he acquired his rights or claim.
(b) Options after joinder. Any party joined pursuant to
par. (a) may 1. participate in the prosecution of the action,
2. agree to have his interest represented by the party who
caused his joinder, or 3. move for dismissal with or without
prejudice. If the party joined chooses to participate in the
prosecution of the action, he shall have an equal voice with
other claimants in such prosecution. If he chooses to have his
interest represented by the party who caused his joinder, he
shall sign a written waiver of his right to participate which
shall express his consent to be bound by the judgment in the
action. Such waiver shall become binding when filed with the
court, but a party may withdraw his waiver upon timely mo-
tion to the judge to whom the case has been assigned with
notice to the other parties. A party who represents the inter-
est of another party and who obtains a judgment favorable
to such other party may be awarded reasonable attorneys fees
by the court. If the party joined moves for dismissal without
prejudice as to his claim, he shall demonstrate to the court
that it would be unjust to require him to prosecute his claim
with the principal claim. In determining whether to grant the
motion to dismiss, the court shall weigh the possible preju-
dice to the movant against the state's interest in economy of
judicial effort.
(c) Scheduling and pre-trial conferences. At the sched-
uling conference and pre-trial conference, the judge to whom
the case has been assigned shall inquire concerning the exist-
ence of and joinder of persons with subrogated, derivative or
assigned rights and shall make such orders as are necessary
to effectuate the purpose of this section [emphasis added].
The Research Reporter for the Judicial Council Committee
stated in his "Commentary to Proposed Rules of Civil Proce-
dure":
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Sub. (2) of the proposed rule is new. It requires claimants
to join as parties to the action all persons who [have] claims
based on subrogation to, derivation from, or assignment of a
part of the claimant's claim. The underlying philosophy of
sub. (2) is that all related rights of action arising out of a
single cause of action should be asserted in a single action.
See Borde v. Hake, 44 Wis.2d 22, 170 N.W.2d 768 (1969), for
the distinction between rights of action and causes of action.
The proposed subsection is seen by the revision committee as
a rather natural expansion of the philosophy underlying s.
102.29 dealing with workmen's compensation cases.53
The Judicial Council Committee's Note, which appears in the
statutes following section 803.03, is slightly different. It states:
Sub. (2) is new. It is intended to foster economy of judicial
effort by requiring that all "parts" of a single cause of action
whether arising by subrogation, derivation or assignment, be
brought before the court in one action. It supplements the
provisions of s. 102.29 concerning third party liability in
workmen's compensation cases. 4
An examination of the above commentaries, coupled with
a close examination of the language of section 803.03(2), raises
two crucial questions:
(1) Is a 102.29 third party claim a claim based upon
"subrogation to part of the claim of another, derivation from
the rights or claim of another, or assignment of part of the
rights or claim of another," so as to result in section 803.03(2)
controlling the procedural handling of such a claim?
(2) If section 803.03(2) does control the procedural han-
dling of a third party action under the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act, does not section 803.03(2)'s mandatory joinder re-
quirement conflict with section 102.29(1), and case law
construing that section which provides for statutory distribu-
tion of proceeds if notice requirements are met, irrespective
of the joinder or nonjoinder of all parties having a right to
make a claim?
A worker's compensation third party claim is difficult to
53. 3 W. HARVEY, WISCONSIN PRACTICE § 3041 (1975).
54. In adopting Wis. STAT. § 803.03(2) (1973), the drafters presumably considered
the policy reasoning which guided the decisions in Patitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358,
240 N.W. 385 (1932), and Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis.2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
Note that the Judicial Council Committee's Note speaks in terms of economy of
judicial effort, a basic premise underlying the court's decision in Patitucci.
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categorize as being based on "subrogation," "derivation," or
"assignment," since a worker's compensation third party claim
is arguably a unique statutory cause of action unlike more tra-
ditional subrogated causes of action. Yet, a finding that section
102.29(1) claims are based on "subrogation," "derivation" or
"assignment" is necessary in order to render section 803.03(2)
applicable. This question will remain unresolved until Wiscon-
sin courts are faced with the statutory conflict.
Accordingly, the remainder of this article will discuss the
potential applicability of section 803.03(2). More particularly,
arguments will be raised both pro and con regarding the ques-
tion of whether or not section 803.03(2) governs the procedural
handling of a section 102.29 third party action.
Proponents of the position that section 803.03(2) is control-
ling might argue that a third party worker's compensation
claim meets the definition of subrogation, derivation or assign-
ment under section 803.03(2). Arguably, section 102.29(1) pro-
vides for "automative subrogation." 5  In addition, proponents
of this position might further argue that a cause of action
brought under section 102.29 is derivative in character, relying
on some case law which suggests that proposition.56
In spite of these arguments that a section 102.29(1) action
falls within the definitional language of section 803.03, there is,
in this author's opinion, an equally strong argument in support
of the position that section 803.03(2) does not govern the proce-
dural handling of a section 102.29 third party action.
A proponent of the position that section 803.03(2) is inap-
plicable might argue that a section 102.29 third party action
is distinguishable in that the section 102.29 cause of action is
a unique statutory cause of action unlike the traditional subro-
55. Judge Barron developed the "automatic subrogation" concept in a recent arti-
cle regarding the collateral source rule. See note 27 supra.
56. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Wis.2d 25, 32, 130 N.W.2d 296,
299-300 (1964), states:
Furthermore, the holdings in . ..London Guarantee & Accident Co. v.
Wisconsin Public Service Corp., [228 Wis. 441, 279 N.W. 76 (1938)], and
Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Icke, [225 Wis. 304, 274 N.W. 283 (1937)]
. .. are of such long standing that they import legislative acquiescence and
acceptance of the principle that a cause of action brought under sec. 102.29 (2),
Stats., is derivative in character.
While it is arguable that a claimant's right of action under §102.29 meets the defini-
tional requirements of "subrogation" and/or "derivation," it is doubtful that a strong
argument can be made that the definitional requirement of an "assignment" is met
in light of the legislative history behind § 102.29. See note 33 supra.
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gated claim. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Girard Steel Sup-
ply Co. ,5 for example, summarized the argument in support of
the unique character of section 102.29(2) as follows:
[Tihe Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognizes that the third
party's liability is grounded in tort and not contract. The fact
that the insurer's cause of action is created by statute and is
not derivative in the sense that it is based on a contractual
theory of assignment or subrogation, does not afford the in-
surer a more advantageous position than that enjoyed by the
injured employee under tort law or his representatives under
a wrongful death statute. While the cause of action created
under this section is independent of and in addition to a
cause of action under tort law or one created by a wrongful
death statute, the action is derivative in the sense that these
actions are predicated upon the common negligent conduct
of a third party, and, in the absence of any wrongdoing, there
can be no recovery.-"
In short, when section 102.29(1) states that an employer
shall have the "right to make claim or maintain an action in
tort against any other party for such injury or death,"59 it is
arguable that this right is an independent right which, while
derivative in the sense that the right to recover is predicated
on the common negligent conduct of the third party, it is not
derivative within the meaning of section 803.03(2). 0
In addition, proponents of the position that section
803.03(2) does not govern the procedural handling of a section
102.29 third party action might further argue that the policy
goals of section 803.03(2) have already been satisfied by the
protections built into section 102.29, and that the drafters of
section 803.03(2) never intended to include a section 102.29
57. 224 F. Supp. 690 (D. Minn. 1964).
58. Id. at 694.
59. WIs. STAT. §102.29(1) (1973).
60. See note 56 supra. See also Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Icke, 225 Wis.
304, 274 N.W. 283 (1937), wherein the court, considering the 1939 version of §102.29,
held that the employer had an independent right to bring a third party action, even
though such right was derivative in nature; and Rice v. Gruetzmacher, 30 Wis.2d 222,
140 N.W.2d 238 (1966), wherein the court considered §102.29(4), distinguished the
Pennsylvania worker's compensation statute from Wisconsin's worker's compensation
statute, and noted that "[t]he Pennsylvania statute gives a right of subrogation to
the workmen's compensation carrier, while the Wisconsin statute gives such carrier a
statutory right in a fixed formula for a monetary recovery." 30 Wis.2d at 228, 140
N.W.2d at 241. Finally, See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§§75.10 and 75.40 (1976).
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situation within the ambit of section 803.03(2).
The Judicial Council Committee Note following section
803.03(2) states that the new statute "is intended to foster
economy of judicial effort by requiring that all 'parts' of a single
cause of action whether arising by subrogation, derivation, or
assignment, be brought before the court in one action." Each
party to be joined is given an "equal voice" in the prosecution
of the action under section 803.03(2)(b). 61
In support of the position that all policy goals underlying
section 803.03(2) have already been met under section
102.29(1), it should be noted that parties receiving notice have,
pursuant to section 102.29, an "equal voice" in the prosecution
of the third party claim. In addition, a certain degree of "econ-
omy of judicial effort" has already been accomplished under
section 102.29 since, if notice is given, all parties having a right
to make a claim are entitled to a statutory distribution, ir-
respective of joinder.
In conclusion, it is unclear at this time whether or not sec-
tion 803.03(2) would control the procedural handling of a third
party action, insofar as joinder is concerned. The question has
practical significance since both the employee and the em-
ployer, or compensation insurer, tactically would not want the
employer, or compensation insurer, to be a party to the action
since a jury might be more sympathetic to the injured worker
if the jury was unaware of the employer's or insurer's involve-
ment. A cautious attorney should raise the question of joinder
at the scheduling and/or pretrial conferences since some courts
may require joinder and others may not.6" Ultimately, judicial
or legislative clarification will be necessary in order to resolve
the conflict between sections 803.03(2) and 102.29(1).
CONCLUSION
The interpretation and application of section 102.29 in third
party actions commenced prior to January 1, 1976, has not
61. See note 54 supra.
62. The court is required by Wis. STAT. §803.03(2)(c) (1973) to raise the question
at the pre-trial conferences:
(c) Scheduling and pre-trial conferences. At the scheduling conference and
pre-trial conference, the judge to whom the case has been assigned shall inquire
concerning the existence of and joinder of persons with subrogated, derivative
or assigned rights and shall make such orders as are necessary to effectuate the
purpose of this section.
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been uniform. Judicial and/or legislative attention is needed in
order to resolve the questions posed by section 102.29 with
respect to joinder, notice and the necessity of assignments of
interests.
The effect of section 803.03 on the handling of worker's
compensation third party actions commenced after January 1,
1976, is not settled at this time. A conflict exists between sec-
tion 102.29 and section 803.03. Judicial and/or legislative at-
tention is needed in order to resolve the conflict presented.
